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ABSTRACT 
JShield : A Java Anti-Reversing Tool 
by Deepti Kundu 
Java is a platform independent language.   Java programs can be executed on any 
machine, irrespective of its hardware or the operating system, as long as a Java virtual 
machine for that platform is available.  A Java compiler converts the source code into 
„bytecode‟ instead of native binary machine code.  This bytecode contains a lot of 
information from and about the source code, which makes it easy to decompile, and 
hence, vulnerable to „reverse engineering attacks‟.  In addition to the obvious security 
implications, businesses and the wider software engineering community also risk 
widespread IP theft - proprietary algorithms, for example, that might be implemented in 
Java could be easily reverse-engineered and copied.  
This thesis addresses the problem of reverse engineering attacks on software 
written in Java.  It analyzes the present defense techniques used to protect software from 
such attacks, examines their limitations and provides a new tool that implements several 
anti-reversing techniques.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
"Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic." 
         (Arthur C. Clarke) 
1.1 Reverse Engineering 
 The process of extracting knowledge or design blueprints from anything man-
made is known as reverse engineering (Eilam, 2005).  In other words, reverse engineering 
may be understood as a systematic methodology for analyzing the design of an existing 
device or system, either as an approach to study the design or as a  
prerequisite for re-design.  “Reverse engineering is the process of analyzing a subject 
system to (i) identify the system‟s components and inter-relationships and (ii) create 
representations of the system in another form or at a higher level of abstraction” 
(Chikofsky & Cross, 1990). 
 In the field of software, developers sometimes do need to understand how existing 
software works.  The concept of reverse engineering, when applied to software leads to 
many interesting consequences.  Various problem areas where reverse engineering has 
been successfully applied are recovery of design patterns (Antoniol et al., 2001), code 
smell detection (Emden & Moonen, 2002), redocumentation of programs (Benedusi et 
al., 1992), renewal of user interfaces (Merlo et al., 1995, Moore, 1998), migration of 
legacy code (Canfora et al., 2000), translation of program from one language to another 
(Byrne, 1991), and architecture recovery (Koschke, 2000). 
Reverse engineering has proved very helpful in many ways.  But on the contrary, 
it has lead to many serious problems.  “Each year software piracy results in billions of 
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dollars in lost revenue” (Chen et al., 2006).  Hacking is one of the challenges that reverse 
engineering has brought into picture ( The terms „hacking‟ and „reverse engineering 
attacks‟ are used interchangeably in this paper.  It refers to the hacking attacks that are 
based on reverse engineering).  “Stealing or replicating someone else‟s ideas has always 
been the easiest way of creating competitive products” (Kalinovsky, 2004).  The process 
of reverse engineering helps in understanding the logic of software which makes it easy 
to alter its behavior or copy the algorithms.  The removal of usage restrictions from 
software, exploitation of software flaws, cheating in the games and breaking the digital 
rights of a system are some such reasons for which the hackers resort to  reverse 
engineering (Stamp, 2006). 
1.2 Process of Reverse Engineering  
 “To reverse engineer a software application it is first necessary to gain physical 
access to it” (Low, 1998).  The process of reverse engineering consists of three steps: (i) 
Parsing and semantic analysis of code, (ii) Extracting information from the code, and (iii) 
Dividing the product into components, as indicated by Figure 1 (Chikofsky & Cross, 
1990).  The software code is parsed and semantic analysis is performed on the parsed 
code.  The information thus obtained is stored in an information base and then this 
information is used to understand the basic functionality and algorithms of the software.  
This knowledge can be used for legitimate reasons like creating a new system with better 
design and functionality or it can be misused. 
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Figure 1 Process of Reverse Engineering 
1.3 Anti-Reverse Engineering 
 The defense techniques implemented in software in order to protect it from 
malicious attacks are referred to anti-reversing techniques.  It has become a challenge for 
the software community to protect software from attackers and to prevent its misuse.  The 
patent system is not quite as effective with software as it is with traditionally engineered 
tangible artifacts.  While a patent mandates IP protection – it is next to impossible to 
prove or even suspect any IP theft in a software product that might have been the result of 
a malicious reverse engineering attack on a patented competitor.  After all, such a 
product, implemented slightly differently from the original, yet using the same core ides 
and algorithms could simply be deemed as an inventive step over „prior art‟ (Kalinovsky, 
2004).  
(Eilam, 2005) states in his book “It is never possible to entirely prevent reversing” 
and (Chen et al., 2006) states “The goal of any “anti” reverse engineering technique is to 
substantially increase the amount of work that a reverse engineering attempt entails, 
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hopefully beyond the useful lifetime of a software application (or a particular version of 
the application)”.  This indicates that it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of an anti-
reversing technique using empirical metrics. 
It is not easy to define criteria for evaluating the different reversing techniques.  
The criteria that can be used for examining the effectiveness of a reversing technique are 
(Nolan, 2004): 
 Potency – How confused the decompiler is? 
 Resilience – Can it rebuff the decompilation attempts? 
 Cost – How much overhead does it cause?  
1.4 Anti-Reversing Tools 
“Reversing is impossible without the right tools” (Eilam, 2005).  There are 
various software tools available on market, free as well as those costing hundreds of 
dollars.  The tools available for reverse engineering include disassemblers available for 
extracting assembly code from the executables, debuggers for dynamic analysis of code 
during execution, and decompilers for generating high-level source code from the 
executables (Chen et al., 2006). 
The most popular disassembling and debugging tools available include OllyDbg 
(Yuschuk, 2000), IDA Pro (Guilfanov, n.d.), SoftICE (SoftICE, n.d.), WinDbg, etc.  
These tools not only extract the assembly code but also help in viewing many other 
details of the software.  They help in analyzing and patching the code as well. 
Java programs are more prone to reversing attacks as “It is more feasible to 
recover Java source code from Java bytecode than it is to recover C/C++ code from 
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machine code” (Cipresso, 2009).  Just a few of the various decompilers available include 
Jad (Kouznetsov, 1997), JODE (Hoenicke, 2002), and Jdec (Belur & Bettadapura, 2006). 
A lot of research is being done in the software field in order to find out successful 
ways of protecting software from reverse engineering attacks.  The techniques proposed 
to make reverse engineering difficult include obfuscating the code (Collberg et al., 1997), 
protecting the computing platform physically (Doorn et al., 2003), encryption of 
executables (Chen et al., 2006), and watermarking (Collberg & Thomborson, 2002).  
1.5 Threat to Java Software 
The threat of reverse engineering attacks has been taken more seriously since the 
advent of Java, because the applications written in Java are easier to reverse engineer 
(Cipresso, 2009).  To understand why, we have to know the difference between Java 
bytecode and machine code. 
 “Machine code or processor instructions are a system of instructions and data 
executed directly by a computer‟s central processing unit” (Machine code, 2010).  
These instructions are specific to the processor on which they are generated.  
Figure 2 illustrates this scenario. 
 “Bytecode  is a set of instructions that looks a lot like some machine code, but is 
not specific to any one processor” (Lemay & Perkins, 1996).  “It is the 
intermediate representation of Java programs just as assembler is the intermediate 
representation of C/C++ programs” (Haggar, 2001).   Figure 3 illustrates the 
generation of bytecode. 
 
6 
 
Figure 2 Machine Codes 
 
Figure 3 Bytecodes 
Java was designed for supporting platform-independent development.  This was 
done by converting the source code into platform-independent bytecode for compilation. 
“Java bytecode is standardized and well documented” (Kalinovsky, 2004).  It contains a 
lot of information about the code and thus it can be easily decompiled to the source code.   
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Another characteristic of Java that proves beneficial to the reverse engineering attackers 
is the use of standard library routines which keeps the size of the application small.  
The design of Java language itself, thus, makes it highly prone to reverse 
engineering attacks.  This has become a big problem, as a number of mission critical 
applications in industries like banking, or simply closed-sourced proprietary applications 
and games are being developed in the Java language.  The purpose of this thesis is to 
analyze the existing anti-reversing techniques that can be implemented to make Java code 
immune to reversing attacks and suggest a tool that automates the process of 
implementing anti-reversing techniques for Java software. 
1.6 Organization of this Thesis 
The work done by various researchers is discussed in Section 2.0.  Section 3.0 
introduces the various anti-reversing techniques and Section 4.0 discusses the tools 
available for obfuscation.  Section 5.0 explains the functionality provided by JShield, 
along with the approaches applied in the prototype tool.  It also presents validation of the 
tool and verification of the results.  Section 6.0 concludes the thesis and proposes the 
related future work to be done in this field.  In the next section, we will discuss research 
done in past years. 
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
“Men are only as good as their technical development allows them to be.” 
(George Orwell) 
There is a significant body of literature documenting the work done so far in the 
field of reverse engineering and anti-reverse engineering. This section cites some prior 
research in the field of reverse engineering and then describes the importance of anti-
reverse engineering and how and why it came into picture. 
2.1 History 
A lot has been done in the field of reverse engineering over the past 20 years 
(Canfora & Penta, 2007). Research in the field of reverse engineering had started in the 
early nineties.  Initially, the research was mainly focused on the analysis of procedural 
software for understanding it and to deal with the Y2K problem (Low, 1998).  
Architecture recovery was another focus area that was facilitated by reverse engineering. 
A number of techniques were proposed for component recovery. 
In short, most research during the nineties was focused on three main problems 
(Canfora & Penta, 2007): 
 Program Analysis 
 Design Recovery 
 Software Visualization 
 The origin of reverse engineering can be traced to software maintenance 
processes and techniques.  The definition of reverse engineering is quite broad today as it 
encompasses a number of fields like aiding software test by creating representations of 
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code (Memon et al., 2003), evaluating software design or examining  software security 
(DaCosta et al., 2003).  (Chikofsky & Cross, 1990) states that the objective of reverse 
engineering in software is “most often to gain a sufficient design-level understanding to 
aid maintenance, strengthen enhancements, or support replacement”. 
2.2 Relation to Reengineering 
 Reverse engineering is sometimes understood to be a restructuring technique used 
for redevelopment of software, which is not precisely what reverse engineering is all 
about.  The objective of the reverse engineering techniques can be broadly classified into 
two categories: redocumentation and design recovery (Canfora & Penta, 2007), as shown 
in Figure 4.  “Redocumentation is the creation or revision of a semantically equivalent 
representation within the same relative abstraction level” (Chikofsky & Cross, 1990) and 
“Design Recovery recreates design abstractions from a combination of code, existing 
design documentation (if available), personal experience, and general knowledge about 
problem and application domains” (Biggerstaff, 1989). 
 
Figure 4 Objectives of Reverse Engineering 
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The argument given in support of this theory is that by definition reverse 
engineering does not include restructuring or reengineering.  Instead, the process of 
reverse engineering is just a phase of reengineering.  Reengineering can be understood as 
a process with three phases - reverse engineering, architecture transformation and 
forward engineering.  As Figure 5 shows, the reverse engineering phase aims at obtaining 
an abstraction of the target software and the forward engineering phase aims at the 
restructuring part. 
 
Figure 5 Reengineering 
 Figure 6 presents the Architecture Reengineering process (Kazman et al., 1998). It 
indicates that architecture recovery is the reverse process of Architecture Development.  
For the transformation of software architecture from one form to another, we have to 
recover the coding approach followed and the architectural plan of the given software.  
This in turn helps us in figuring out the design patterns implemented in the software. 
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Figure 6 Architecture Reengineering 
 
 (Chikofsky & Cross, 1990) give a clear definition and distinction between the 
terms reverse engineering, forward engineering, restructuring and reengineering using 
three software life-cycle stages.  The three life-cycle stages that they use are – 
requirement analysis, design, and implementation.  Figure 7 pictures the relationship 
between the aforesaid terms. 
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Figure 7 Relationship of terms 
 
2.3 Decade of Achievements 
 A lot has been done in the field of reverse engineering over the past 20 years 
(Canfora & Penta, 2007).  We see significant advancements made over the past decade.  
The work done in the field of software reverse engineering has been disseminated in 
multiple software engineering conferences and journals.  As discussed earlier, the 
research work was focused on the problems of program analysis and its applications, 
architecture and design recovery, and visualization.  The following sections discuss the 
advancements made in these fields over the past 10 years. 
2.3.1 Program Analysis 
A number of tools have been developed to help in the analysis of computer 
programs.  Initially these tools used static analysis, but eventually this approach was 
found lacking for many programs where dynamic analysis was required (Systä, 2000).  
Dynamic analysis is necessary in many situations and is widely used despite being 
expensive and incomplete (Ernst, 2003).  A number of new analysis techniques have been 
developed to address the different challenges faced by the software community.  For 
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example, the complexity of program analysis increases with program size. So, techniques 
like island parsing and lake parsing are employed to analyze only small fragments of 
code at a time instead of entire programs in one go (Moonen, 2001).  
Another event that inspired the research effort in the field of program analysis is 
the presence of clones in software systems (Canfora & Penta, 2007).  The different 
techniques developed as an outcome include token-based (Baker, 1995), AST-based 
(Baxter et al., 1998), and metrics-based (Leblanc et al., 1996) techniques. 
2.3.2 Architecture and Design Recovery 
Initially, the role of reverse engineering in the field of architecture and design 
recovery was focused on recovering high level architectures from procedural code. With 
the diffusion of object oriented languages and Unified Model Language (UML), it 
became important to recover UML models as well from source code.   
 (Potrich & Tonella, 2005) proposed the static approach for recovering class 
diagrams and also demonstrated that static analysis was insufficient as it did not contain 
any information about flow propagation. They successfully extracted sequence diagrams 
using static analysis on data flow. (Systä, 2000) recovered the UML diagrams by using a 
combination of static and dynamic analysis techniques.  
Another concept that had become very popular along with object-oriented 
development was design patterns.  Recovering the design pattern from the code was 
helpful in code reuse and assessing code quality.  Both static (Antoniol et al., 2001) and 
dynamic analysis techniques (Heuzeroth et al., 2003) were used to recover design 
patterns. 
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2.3.3 Visualization 
 Software visualization is a blessing to the reverse engineers.  A pictorial 
representation of information greatly benefits both the analyzer and the developer.  The 
proper visualization of the program and the information extracted from its analysis is 
very important for gaining clearer understanding the code.  The code flow becomes much 
easier to understand with a tool that is capable of presenting relevant information at the 
right level of detail (Canfora & Penta, 2007).  A number of such tools are available, like 
Rigi (Muller et al., 1995), CodeCrawler (Marziali, n.d.), Seesoft (Easterbrook et al., 
2003), and sv3D (Feng et al., 2003). All these tools provide useful visualization of the 
software using various techniques. One of these tools, Rigi, can show architectural views, 
while sv3D can render software architecture metrics in a 3D visual representation. “Code 
Crawler combines the capability of showing software entities and their relationships, with 
the capability of visualizing software metrics using polymetric views, which show 
different metrics using the width, the length, and the color of the boxes” (Canfora & 
Penta, 2007). 
 These advancements in the field of reverse engineering not only indicate the 
progress made, but also portray the potentials of reverse engineering. With the tools 
developed for the purpose of helping the software community, another set of people have 
been benefitted – the hacker community. With so many tools at hand, they can misuse or 
reuse a lot of licensed software and the algorithms, without paying a dime to the owners. 
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2.4 Future Trend 
While researchers are working on development of more advanced tools to 
facilitate the process of reverse engineering, in doing so, they are also making the job of 
hackers much easier. With the advancement in the field of dynamic analysis of programs, 
hackers can not only analyze their target software statically but can also uncover the 
exact implementations of its underlying algorithms. The availability of a wide range of 
efficient decompilers for high level languages like Java makes it all the more difficult to 
protect  software as it is now possible to recover an almost exact copy of the source code 
from a class file.  We have already discussed (Section 1.3) that copyrights and patents are 
not very effective.  So it is a big challenge for IP owners to protect their code by 
incorporating anti-reversing techniques into their code. 
In the next section, we will discuss about various anti-reversing techniques used 
to protect java programs from malicious attacks. 
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3.0 ANTI-REVERSING TECHNIQUES 
"A lock only ever stopped an honest man." 
          (Ancient Egyptian Proverb) 
3.1 Protecting Java Code 
 The software development community has been working on this problem of 
protecting Java software for many years.  The techniques that can currently be used to 
protect Java source code are given in Figure 8 (Nolan, 2004). These techniques are 
briefly discussed here: 
 
Figure 8 Ways of Protecting Java Code 
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3.1.1 Compilation Flags 
The bytecode generated by the compiler is affected by different types of 
compilation flags (Nolan, 2004).  Use of the –g flag during compilation generates 
debugging tables that contain information about line numbers and local variables (javac, 
n.d.).  This information is very useful for the decompiler to retrieve the source code.  So,   
compilation with –g:none  keeps information like lines, vars, and the source file 
attributes out of the classfile (Nolan, 2004).  
3.1.2 Implementing Two Versions of the Application 
It is a popular trend in the software industry to let users download a fully 
functional evaluation copy of the software that can be used up to a predefined period of 
time or a certain number of usages.  This introduces the potential threat of malicious 
users removing these limitations to activate a functional copy of the software without 
having paid for it after their trial period expired.  A possible solution is to implement two 
versions of the software; with a cut-down trial version that does not reveal all its 
functionality.  Thus the user is forced to buy the original software if they like the trial 
version. (Nolan, 2004) 
3.1.3 Applying Obfuscation 
“Obfuscated code is source or machine code that has been made difficult to 
understand for humans” (Obfuscated code, 2010). There are a number of techniques used 
to obfuscate code and it is the method used in this thesis.  The different techniques for 
obfuscation have been discussed in detail in the next section (3.2 Obfuscation 
Techniques). 
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3.1.4 Using Web Services and Server-Side Execution 
Most modern software applications have multi-tier architectures as a best practice 
– mainly to keep them maintainable, to keep different layers decoupled, accessible 
through browsers, and to facilitate ease of enhancements etc. But, as a positive side 
effect, splitting applications into presentation and business tiers also protects the code 
from inquisitive eyes.  By keeping the business layer (which contains the actual business 
logic/code) on a remote server, the client side applet or application presents just the user 
interface which does not contain much information, apart from, maybe remote URI‟s and 
top level API‟s (Nolan, 2004).  
3.1.5 Encryption 
“Throughout the ages, mankind has turned to encryption when trying to protect 
secret transmissions” (Nolan, 2004).  A common solution suggested for preventing the 
code from decompilation is to encrypt the class files.  These class files are not decrypted 
until before they are executed. 
3.1.6 Digital Rights Management 
It is clear from our discussion so far that the bytecode needs to be kept out of 
reach of the end user in order to prevent them from decompiling the code.  Ultimately, it 
would be wiser to protect the code by simply securing the browser and class loader using 
a trusted browser.  The browser should not let the end user access the cache which 
contains code. (Nolan, 2004) 
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3.1.7 Fingerprinting the Code 
Digital fingerprinting is a string of binary digits that uniquely identifies a file 
(Digital Fingerprint, n.d.).  It is usually in the form of a copyright notice that helps you to 
identify your code.  Inserting a fingerprint does not provide any protection but it helps in 
protecting the copyright by providing a way for the developer to prove that the code was 
originally written by him. (Nolan, 2004) 
3.1.8 Selling Source Code 
“If source code is so readily available, then why not just sell it at a higher price?” 
(Nolan, 2004).  The decompiler can be discouraged to decompile if you sell the source 
code directly to him. It will bring in some more revenue for the programmer and the 
programmer will not have to worry about protecting the code. 
3.1.9 Employing Native Methods 
We discussed in Section 1.5 that code written in Java is more difficult to protect 
than that written in C/C++.  (Nolan, 2004) suggests that we can protect our Java code by 
compiling it in C or C++.  It is possible to do this in Java by using the Java Native 
Interface (JNI).  It might cause portability issues but is useful if portability is not an issue. 
3.2 Obfuscation Techniques 
 There are a number of techniques that can be used to make software immune to 
reversing attacks.  Many of these techniques are used by the obfuscators available in the 
market.  This section discusses various obfuscation techniques that can prove beneficial 
in protecting Java software from reversing attacks.  Before we discuss the different 
techniques of obfuscation, it is important to know that obfuscation techniques can also be 
20 
classified based upon the stage at which the obfuscation is applied.  Obfuscation can be 
classified into three classes (Sogiros, n.d.): 
 Source code obfuscation: The obfuscation is performed on the source code. 
 Bytecode obfuscation: The transformations are performed on the bytecode of the 
compiled software. 
 Binary code obfuscation: The obfuscation is achieved by rewriting the 
instructions at machine code level. 
 Figure 9 gives another classification of the obfuscation techniques (Nolan, 2004, 
Collberg et al., 1997) based upon how the code is obfuscated.  
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Figure 9 Obfuscation – A Classification 
 
3.2.1 Layout Obfuscation 
Obfuscators available on the market work by scrambling the identifiers in the 
classfile to make the decompiled source useless.  The variables are renamed with 
automatically generated garbage variables which do not affect the code functionality as 
the classfile uses pointers to methods and variables instead of actual names.  It becomes 
difficult to understand the code but it is not impossible.  A disassembler can be used to 
rename the variables in order to generate more meaningful names. (Nolan, 2004) 
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3.2.2 Control Obfuscation 
The idea behind control obfuscation is to disguise the real control flow (Low, 
1998).  The control flow of the source code is altered to confuse anyone looking at the 
decompiled code (Nolan, 2004).  (Kalinovsky, 2004) states, “The best obfuscators are 
capable of transforming the execution flow of bytecode by inserting bogus conditional 
and goto statements”.  (Collberg et al., 1997) classifies control obfuscation into three 
different categories – computation, aggregation, and ordering. 
3.2.2.1 Computation 
Computation techniques alter the control flow in a program.  It is a type of control 
obfuscation which can be broken down into following techniques (Nolan, 2004): 
 Insert Dead or Irrelevant Code 
 The insertion of dead code or junk code confuses the attacker.  You insert 
code that will never be executed and/or will never contribute to the functionality 
of the program.  “This code can include extra methods or simply a few lines of 
irrelevant code” (Nolan, 2004).  It is important to note here that this dead code is 
to confuse the decompiler and the attacker.  Unless the size of program is too 
small, it will take some effort and time for the attacker to figure out that those 
chunks of code are actually doing nothing. 
 (Nolan, 2004) states, “Don‟t just limit yourself to thinking about inserting 
Java code, there‟s no reason why you can‟t insert irrelevant bytecode”.  The 
reason why incorrect bytecode can be inserted into the class file without affecting 
the functionality of the program is that the rules of bytecode format verification 
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are not strictly enforced by the JRE.  This corrupted code does not affect the 
functionality of the original code but crashes on a decompilation effort. 
(Kalinovsky, 2004) 
 Extend Loop Condition 
 Complicating the loop conditions introduces obfuscation in the code.  This 
can be done by extending the loop condition with a second or third condition that 
doesn‟t do anything (Nolan, 2004).  For example, in the following example we 
have a simple if condition. 
Before: After: 
int x = 1; 
if (x > 200) 
{ 
 … 
 x ++; 
 // call function 
abc(x) 
             } 
int x = 1; 
while (x> 200 || 
x%200==0) 
{ 
 … 
 x ++; 
 // call function 
abc(x) 
} 
  This condition is easy to understand as it has no calculation involved.  But 
if we replace this code with condition that does the same job but looks complex, it 
might make it a little more time consuming for an attacker to understand the logic. 
 Reducible to Nonreducible 
 “The Holy Grail of obfuscation is to create obfuscated code that cannot be 
converted back into its original format” (Nolan, 2004).  We can devise some 
transformations that make the code nonreducible to its original form.  For 
example, the Java bytecode has goto instruction while no equivalent statement 
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exists in the Java language.  So, the flow graphs produced from Java programs are 
always reducible, while those from Java bytecode may express non-reducible 
flow graphs.  Expressing non-reducible flow graphs is inconvenient in Java due to 
unavailability of goto statements, so we need to do some transformation for 
converting the reducible flow graph into a non-reducible one.  We can achieve 
this by converting a structured loop into a loop with multiple headers (Collberg et 
al., 1997).  For example, see the code below: 
Before: After: 
Statement 1; 
while (condition1) 
{ 
 Statement2; 
     } 
Statement 1; 
if(condition2)  
{ 
Statement2'; 
while (condition1){ 
    Statement2; 
} 
else { 
while (condition1){ 
      Statement2; 
}} 
 In this example, we had a simple while condition.  We split the statement 
to make it appear more complicated than it actually is. 
 Add Redundant Operands 
 Adding some insignificant terms to the code, in the basic calculations 
confuses the reverse engineer.  For example, let‟s assume that there is an integer 
variable, „p‟ that stores the product of two integer variables – „a‟ and „b‟.  The 
code below shows we can make the calculations look complex to the attacker. 
(Nolan, 2004) 
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Before: After: 
public int sum{ 
     int a = 5; 
     int b = 7; 
     int p; 
 
     p = a * b; 
    
System.out.println(“ 
Product =” + p); 
} 
 
public int sum{ 
     int a = 5, b = 7; 
     double i = 0.0005; 
     double j = 0.0007; 
     double p; 
 
     p = (a * b) + (i*j); 
     System.out.println(“ 
Product =” + (int) p); 
} 
 Both of these code snippets will generate exactly the same output, just that 
the second one looks more complex than the original one.  (Nolan, 2004) warns 
that using this technique all through the application has the potential to degrade its 
performance. 
 Remove Programming Idioms 
 Most programmers reuse the code that they have written for some 
previous application.  In other words, they reuse the components, methods, and 
classes they had written for a previous application in a slightly different manner.  
The book Refactoring: Improving the Design of Existing Code (Addison-Wesley, 
1999) written by Martin Fowler has created a standard for programming in Java 
by presenting how to refactor some existing code into shape.  Such 
standardization created a series of programming idioms which prove helpful to 
the hacker in reversing the code.  (Collberg et al., 1997) states, “An experienced 
reverse engineer will search for such patterns to jump-start his understanding of 
an unfamiliar program”.  So, in order to prevent such hints the programmer 
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should write sloppy code.  It is not good for the performance and long-term 
maintenance of code but ensures that the hacker does not gather much knowledge 
about your code without even reversing it. (Nolan, 2004) 
 According to (Collberg et al., 1997), “Most programs written in Java rely 
heavily on calls to standard libraries”.  This also provides a lot of information to 
the reverse engineers.  These calls are made to the library artifacts by name and 
hence these names cannot be obfuscated.  The solution to this problem is to make 
your own version of standard libraries and then calling them instead. (Collberg et 
al., 1997) 
 Parallelize Code 
 One thing that can staggeringly increase the complexity of your program 
is the introduction of threads (Nolan, 2004).  The parallelization process is usually 
done to increase the performance, but the motive of introduction of threads is to 
hide the actual flow of code from the hacker (Collberg et al., 1997).  The two 
suggested methods of doing this by (Collberg et al., 1997) are: 
1. Create dummy processes which do not actually perform anything useful. 
2. Split a sequential section of the program into multiple sections executing 
in parallel. 
(Nolan, 2004) points out that there is a programming overhead to ensure 
that the threads are in proper order and is not interfering with the proper 
functioning of the program. 
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3.2.2.2 Aggregation 
Aggregation obfuscation alters how statements are grouped together (Gupta, 
2005).  (Collberg et al., 1997) has included following techniques in this category: 
 Inline and Outline Methods 
 In Java, inlining (replacing a method call with the actual body of method) 
results in ballooning of code which makes it difficult to understand the code.  It 
makes inlining an excellent technique to obfuscate the code.  It should be noted 
that this is a one way transformation.  Once the method call has been replaced by 
the actual code, the function is removed and all traces of abstraction are removed 
from the code. (Collberg et al., 1997) 
 “You can also balloon the code by taking some of the inlined methods and 
outlining them into a dummy method that looks like it‟s being called but doesn‟t 
actually do anything” (Nolan, 2004). 
 Interleave Methods 
 It is an important and difficult task in reverse engineering to detect 
interleaved code (Collberg et al., 1997).  (Rugaber, 2000) writes: 
 “Subcomponents interact with each other. If the interactions are limited 
and occur through explicit interfaces, the component is said to be encapsulated. 
If, usually for reasons of efficiency, two or more design ideas are realized in the 
same section of code or by the same data structure, then the components 
corresponding to those ideas are said to be interleaved.” 
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 Two methods of a class can be interleaved by merging their parameter lists 
and adding an extra parameter that will differentiate between the calls to 
individual methods (Collberg et al., 1997).  It is a significantly more difficult task 
to separate out the interleaved methods as compared to interleaving them (Nolan, 
2004).  For illustration of this technique we consider the following example where 
we have combined two methods, calTax and emailSalDetails into one method 
calTaxEmailSalDetails just to confuse the hacker. 
Before: 
void calTax (int employeeGrade, double salary){ 
if(employeeId < 4){ 
     printSalaryStub (salary*0.3); 
} else{ 
     printSalaryStub (salary*0.4); 
} 
 
void emailSalDetails (int employeeId){ 
    printHeader(); 
    printSalDetails(employeeId); 
    printFooter(); 
} 
After: 
void calTaxEmailSalDetails(int choice, int 
employeeId, int employeeGrade, double salary){ 
     printHeader(); 
if (choice == 1){ 
     if(employeeId < 4){ 
         printSalaryStub (salary*0.3); 
     } else{ 
         printSalaryStub (salary*0.4); 
     } 
else{ 
    printHeader(); 
    printSalDetails(employeeId); 
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    printFooter(); 
}}} 
 
 
 Clone Methods 
It is important for a reverse engineer to understand the purpose of a 
function and it is equally important to understand the different conditions under 
which the function is called (Collberg et al., 1997).  We can create clones of a 
function and make calls to these functions under identical circumstances.  We can 
call the function depending on any external factor, which appears to be a deciding 
factor but is actually not.  One good example would be to call a different function 
based on the day of the week. (Nolan, 2004) 
 Loop Transformations 
In order to improve the performance of numerical applications, a number 
of loop transformations have been designed.  Some of these transformations tend 
to increase the complexity of the code and hence are of interest to us (Collberg et 
al., 1997).  Some of these transformations are – loop blocking (“breaks up the 
iteration space so that the inner loop fits in cache thus improving the cache 
behavior” (Collberg et al., 1997)), loop unrolling (“replicates the body of the loop 
one or more times. If the loop bounds are known at compile time, the loop can be 
enrolled in its entirety” (Collberg et al., 1997)), and loop fission (“turns a loop 
with compound body into several loops with the same iteration space” (Collberg 
et al., 1997)). 
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3.2.2.3 Ordering 
Ordering transformations relate to altering the order in which the statements will 
be executed in the application (Gupta, 2005). 
 Reorder Statements and Expressions 
 The reordering of statements and expressions does not complicate the code 
much for the reverse engineer.  But reordering the expressions obfuscates the 
code significantly if applied at bytecode level as it disrupts the link between the 
Java source code and bytecode. (Nolan, 2004) 
 Reorder Loops 
A simple obfuscation technique is to reorder the loops.  For example, 
transforming a loop so that it moves backwards.  It is shown below: 
Before: After: 
val = 0; 
while (val < maxVal) 
{ 
   arr[val] += res[val]; 
   val++; 
} 
val = maxVal; 
while (val >0) 
{ 
    val--;    
    arr[val] += res[val]; 
} 
3.2.3 Data Obfuscation 
Data obfuscation techniques refer to the transformations that obnubilate the data 
structures in the source code.  These techniques are classified into four categories based 
on how they affect data – storage and encoding, aggregation, and order. (Collberg et al., 
1997) 
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3.2.3.1 Storage and Encoding 
These techniques target the data structures.  They change the way data is stored 
and how the stored data in interpreted.  For example, changing the type of a variable or 
replacing an existing value of a variable with a more complex looking equivalent.  We 
will now discuss all these techniques in detail here. 
 Change Encoding 
 (Collberg et al., 1997) show a simple example of encoding in the paper.  
An integer variable i = 1 is transformed into i' = x*i+y.  If we choose x 
= 6 and y = 5, we get transformations shown below: 
Before: After: 
int i = 1; 
while (i <= 100) { 
    result = arr[i-1]; 
    i++;} 
int i = 11; 
while (i <= 605) { 
    result = arr[(i-
5)/6]; 
    i+=6;} 
 Split Variables 
 The variables with restricted range like Boolean can be split into two or 
more parts in order to make them less obvious to the reverse engineer.  (Collberg 
et al., 1997) says, “We will write a variable V split into k variables p1, …, pk as V 
= [p1, …, pk].”  For example, if we have to define the Boolean value of a 
variable bool = true, then we can split it into bool1 = 0 and bool2 =1, 
and use the following lookup table to change it back to the Boolean value. (Nolan, 
2004) 
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bool1 bool2 bool 
1 0 false 
0 1 true 
 
 Convert Static to Procedural Data 
 The strings in the source are used to store very critical information like 
copyright information.  If this static data is converted to procedural data, the job 
of the hacker will become significantly tough.  As an example, the copyright 
information could be generated programmatically within the code rather than 
being stored directly in a string.  This kind of transformation is not very practical 
as it is not trivial to implement and it cannot be automated. (Nolan, 2004) 
3.2.3.2 Aggregation 
Aggregation transformations change the grouping of the data.  An example is 
splitting an array into several sub-arrays. (Gupta, 2005) 
 Merge Scalar Variables 
 “The variables can be merged together, or converted to a different base 
and then merged together.  The variables‟ values can be stored in a series of bits 
and pulled out using a variety of bitmask operators (Nolan, 2004).” 
 Class Transformations 
 A series of class transformations can prove helpful in making the program 
difficult to understand.  As the depth of an application‟s class hierarchy increases, 
so does its complexity.  One good way of achieving this is to use inheritance and 
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interfaces to the extreme to create deep class hierarchies that will make it more 
difficult for the hacker to understand the application. (Nolan, 2004) 
 Inserting a bogus class can confuse the reverse engineer.  But it is 
important that the bogus class should be called by the actual program else 
shrinker (Section 3.3) will very easily get rid of the class. 
 Array Transformations 
 Just like variables, we can split, merge, or interleave arrays in order to 
obfuscate the code.  We can split the array depending on the index position – 
placing all the values on even indices stored in one array and those on odd indices 
in another. (Nolan, 2004) 
3.2.3.3 Ordering 
As noted in the previous section, randomizing computations obfuscates the code.  
Similarly, randomizing the order of declarations also confuses the reverse engineer.. 
(Collberg et al., 1997) 
 Reorder Methods, Arrays, and Instance Variables 
It is a good idea to just move methods, arrays and data declarations across 
the code, so that the reverse engineer spends some time figuring out details of 
each.  We should ensure that the data elements remain in the appropriate scope 
while doing this. (Nolan, 2004) 
3.3 Some Terminology 
Before we move on to the next section, it will be helpful to understand a few 
terms clearly. 
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 Shrinker:  
 Shrinking removes all the unused code from the application.  It is not 
exactly an obfuscation technique but many tools do provide shrinking as an 
additional benefit (Kalinovsky, 2004).  Eliminating the unused code reduces the 
size of the jar file. 
 Optimizer: 
 An optimizer helps to optimize and verify the compiled Java applications. 
It analyses the application for problems like memory leaks, code bottlenecks, 
presence of unwanted attributes in classfile, etc.  It improves the performance of 
the application. (Foley, 2009) 
 Obfuscator: 
 A tool that applies obfuscation techniques to software in order to protect it 
from reverse engineering attacks is called an obfuscator. 
 Preverifier: 
 “Preverification performs certain checks on the Java bytecode ahead of 
runtime. If this first verification pass is OK, the preverifier annotates the classfiles 
and then saves the annotated class files” (jGuru, 2000).  When Kernel-based 
Virtual Machine (KVM) attempts to execute the application, it checks the Java 
class files for these preverification annotations.  If the proper annotations are 
present in the class files, it guarantees that certain compile-time checks were 
made.  So the verification and the security checks of KVM are passed faster, thus 
ensuring faster execution times. (jGuru, 2000) 
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 In the next section, we will examine the functionality and capability of 
some existing tools. 
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4.0 EXISTING OBFUSCATORS 
“It has become appallingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our humanity.” 
        (Albert Einstein) 
4.1 Tool Support 
 There are a number of tools on the market, both open source and commercial that 
claim to obfuscate software, making it immune to reverse engineering attacks.  These 
include ProGuard (Lafortune, n.d.), Jshrink (Eastridge Technology, n.d.), Zelix 
KlassMaster (Zelix KlassMaster, n.d.), and Semantic Designs Java Obfuscator (Semantic 
Designs, n.d.).  Table below highlights the features of each one of them (Google 
directory, n.d.). 
Table 1 Java Obfuscators 
Tool Works on Feature Type of Tool 
ProGuard Bytecode Shrinker, Optimizer, and 
Obfuscator 
Open Source 
Jshrink Bytecode Obfuscator Commercial 
Zelix KlassMaster Bytecode Obfuscator Commercial 
Semantic Designs 
Java Obfuscator 
Source code Obfuscator Commercial 
  
 An obfuscator can definitely protect software to a certain extent. But it does not 
imply that the software cannot be reverse engineered.  With enough time and effort, an 
attacker can still retrieve enough information about the software and misuse it.  We 
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discussed in Section 1.3 that the level of security that is provided by any obfuscator 
depends on three factors – potency, resilience, and cost. (Nolan, 2004) 
4.2 Brief Analysis of Existing Tools 
 Table 2 compares the popular Java Obfuscators available in market.  Different 
obfuscators are listed along with the anti-reversing techniques that they use in order to 
obfuscate Java programs.  It also compares their prices.   This comparison is not for all 
the techniques that we discussed in Section 3.0; it just verifies if the tool implements at 
least one technique from that category. 
Table 2 Comparison of Java Obfuscators 
PRODUCT ProGuard Jshrink Zelix 
KlassMaster 
Semantic Designs 
Java Obfuscator 
Price Free $95 $199-$399 $200-$260 
Layout 
Obfuscation 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Data 
Obfuscation 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control 
Obfuscation 
No No Yes No 
Shrinking Yes Yes Yes No 
Optimization Yes Yes Yes No 
 
4.2.1 ProGuard 
  “ProGuard is a free Java class file shrinker, optimizer, obfuscator, and preverifier. 
It detects and removes unused classes, fields, methods, and attributes. It optimizes 
bytecode and removes unused instructions. It renames the remaining classes, fields, and 
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methods using short meaningless names. Finally, it preverifies the processed code for 
Java 6 or for Java Micro Edition.” (Lafortune, n.d.)  
 
Figure 10 ProGuard 
 
We used a simple calculator program to test all these tools.  Our program was 
packaged in a jar file called calc.jar and this is how we will refer to it hereafter.   
Observations: 
 ProGuard is available for free use under the GPL (General Public License).  We 
used ProGuard to obfuscate calc.jar.  Here is my list of observations: 
 The resultant jar file (referred to as calc_proguard.jar hereafter) did not execute 
successfully. 
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 We were able to decompile cal_proguard.jar using Jad (Kouznetsov, 1997).   
 After decompiling the cal_proguard.jar, we compared it with the program‟s 
original source code.  The techniques used by ProGuard to obfuscate code are – 
layout obfuscation and data obfuscation. 
 ProGuard uses name mangling to implement layout obfuscation.  All the methods 
and variable names were converted to single alphabets like a, or b, so on.  It also 
provides an option to generate a mapping file to print the mapping between the 
old names and new names for classes and class members. 
 Data obfuscation was implemented by reordering the methods.  The control flow 
was left undisturbed. 
 Additionally, debugging information was removed by the tool.  It is not exactly an 
obfuscation technique but helps improve security by removing any hints for the 
reverse engineer in the form of line numbers, vars, etc. 
 Table 3 summarizes the obfuscation techniques implemented by ProGuard. 
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Table 3 ProGuard Obfuscation Observations 
PROGUARD Yes No 
Did the .jar file run after the 
obfuscation? 
 √ 
Name Mangling √  
String Encryption  √ 
Control Flow Obfuscation  √ 
Reorder Methods √  
Remove Debugging 
Information 
√  
 
4.2.2 Jshrink 
Jshrink is a Java obfuscator that shrinks the program size by removing unused 
code and data.  It obfuscates symbolic names and performs optimization on the code.  
Jshrink does produce its results in form of a Java jar file.  It comes with an inbuilt 
decompiler that is used to validate its results. (Eastridge Technology, n.d.) 
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Figure 11 Jshrink 
 
Observations: 
 An evaluation version of Jshrink is available for free, and the cost of getting a 
licensed copy of Jshrink is $95.  We used Jshrink to obfuscate calc.jar and our 
observations are listed below: 
 The resultant jar file (referred to as calc_jshrink.jar hereafter) did execute 
successfully. 
 None of the methods or variables was renamed in my example.  The strings were 
left without any encryption. 
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 No control flow obfuscation was implemented.  The tool successfully removed all 
debugging information. 
 Table 4 summarizes the obfuscation techniques implemented by Jshrink. 
Table 4 Jshrink Obfuscation Observations 
JSHRINK Yes No 
Did the .jar file run after the 
obfuscation? 
√  
Name Mangling  √ 
String Encryption  √ 
Control Flow Obfuscation  √ 
Reorder Methods  √ 
Remove Debugging 
Information 
√  
 
4.2.3 Zelix KlassMaster 
The various techniques that Zelix KlassMaster uses in order to obfuscate 
applications are – name obfuscation, flow obfuscation, line number scrambling, and 
string encryption.  It also applies some shrinking, which reduces the size of the input file.  
Figure 12 shows the user interface provided by the tool. 
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Figure 12 Zelix KlassMaster 
Observations: 
 An evaluation version of Zelix KlassMaster is available for free, and the cost for 
getting a licensed version is $199-$399.  We obfuscated calc.jar using Zelix KlassMaster.  
Here is a list of observations: 
 The resultant jar file (referred to as calc_zelix.jar hereafter) did execute 
successfully. 
 Zelix KlassMaster successfully mangled the names of the methods and the 
variables of the class. 
 Strings which were in plain text prior to obfuscation were successfully encrypted. 
 It changed the loops thus altering the control flow for functions. It did these 
changes to only one function in my example (It is a limitation of the trial version. 
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Zelix KlassMaster claims that the same code obfuscation is implemented to all the 
functions in the commercial version of the tool) 
 The data was not restructured. It was left unaltered. 
 Table 5 summarizes the obfuscation techniques implemented by Zelix 
KlassMaster. 
Table 5 Zelix KlassMaster Obfuscation Observations 
ZELIX KLASSMASTER Yes No 
Did the .jar file run after the 
obfuscation? 
√  
Name Mangling √  
String Encryption √  
Control Flow Obfuscation √  
Reorder Methods  √ 
Remove Debugging Information √  
 
4.2.4 Semantic Designs Java Obfuscator 
 The Java obfuscator from Semantic Designs is not available for trial.  Semantic 
Designs claims that the tool scrambles the source code making it difficult to reverse 
engineer.  The features that the tool provides are as following: 
 Name mangling to replace the identifiers with meaningless names. 
 Changes the structure of the code and removes all the comments – to preserve 
copyright information. 
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 Figure 13 shows a section of code obfuscated by the tool (Semantic Designs, n.d.)  
(adopted from the company website, as the tool is not available for trial): 
Before: 
    
 
After: 
 
 
Figure 13 Semantic Designs Java Obfuscators – Output 
 
 Another fact worthy of being noted here about the commercially available tools is 
that each tool itself implements only a subset of the available anti-reversing techniques 
46 
but none of them implements all the techniques.  (Nolan, 2004) states, “Most of the Java 
obfuscators you‟ll meet only perform layout obfuscation with some limited data and 
control obfuscation.” 
 The reason is that the automation of many of these techniques is very complicated 
and it has a tendency to alter the logic, and in some cases, affect the portability of the 
program.  (Nolan, 2004) also verifies this fact, “…the main reason Java obfuscators don‟t 
feature more high-level obfuscation techniques is because the obfuscated code has to 
work on a variety of Java Virtual Machines (JVMs).” 
4.3 Summary 
 The availability of so many tools in the market clearly indicates the importance of 
the anti-reversing. The software community needs a strong defense against hackers as 
current anti-reversing techniques do not make hacking impossible; they just make it 
difficult and time-consuming. 
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5.0 PROPOSED TOOL - JShield 
“All perceiving is also thinking, all reasoning is also intuition, all observation is also 
invention.”        (Rudolf Arnheim) 
5.1 Introduction 
 Applying anti-reversing techniques is a complex procedure.  It involves detailed 
scrutiny of the code, extracting information about its design, and making changes to the 
data and control flow without altering the program logic.  Our tool – JShield, automates a 
number of obfuscation techniques discussed earlier in this paper.  The automation of all 
the techniques is very difficult because of their complexity and limitations of the 
implementation language. Manual application of all the techniques is not feasible as it is 
time consuming and becomes unmanageable with increase in the program size and 
complexity. 
5.2 JShield Functionality 
 This section outlines the functionality and features provided by JShield.  The tool 
analyzes Java code and applies various obfuscation techniques to the code to make it 
harder to reverse engineer.  JShield is a relatively small tool that uses an ANTLR 
(ANTLR, n.d.) generated parser to parse the input Java source code.  “ANTLR (ANother 
Tool for Language Recognition) is a language tool that provides a framework for 
generating parser from grammatical descriptions” (ANTLR, n.d.) (See Appendix A for 
details).  As a proof of concept for our findings, JShield currently works on a single Java 
file at a time and generates an obfuscated output that is remarkably difficult to reverse 
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engineer.  It can be easily modified and extended to obfuscate an entire project containing 
several Java source files.  Figure 14 shows a screenshot of the JShield user interface. 
 
Figure 14 JShield 
 
5.3 Techniques Implemented by JShield 
 The JShield code itself uses the data structures listed in Section 5.4.1. It then 
works based on the information generated by the parser.  JShield applies the following 
obfuscation techniques to a Java program: (All the obfuscation techniques implemented 
by JShield are adopted from Section 3.2 suggested by (Collberg et al., 1997) and (Nolan, 
2004)). 
 Layout Obfuscation 
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o Scramble identifiers 
 Control Obfuscation 
o Insert dead or irrelevant code 
o Extend loop condition 
o Add redundant operands 
 Data Obfuscation 
o Insert bogus class 
o Reorder methods 
o Convert static to procedural data 
The algorithms for implementing each one of these obfuscation techniques are 
discussed in detail in Section 5.4.3. 
5.4 Design and Implementation 
5.4.1 Implementation Platform 
JShield is implemented in C# and uses an ANTLR generated parser (ANTLR, 
n.d.) for parsing the program.  The IDE used for development is Microsoft Visual Studio 
2005.  The tool applies all the obfuscation techniques in one step and gives the option of 
reviewing the code before it is saved.  The input and output are both Java source code.  
As mentioned above, the tool uses various data structures for implementing different 
obfuscation techniques. The responsibility of these data structures is given in Table 6 
below: 
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Table 6 Data Structures used in JShield 
Data Structure Name Type Responsibility 
importArrayList Array List Stores all the imports of the 
program 
packageArrayList Array List Stores the package 
information of the java class 
methodArrayList Array List Stores the list of all the 
methods implemented in the 
source code 
variableArrayList Array List Stores the list of all the 
variables used in the 
program 
calledMethodArrayList Array List Stores the list of reference 
objects created in the class 
globalVarArrayList Array List This array list stores the 
information of all the 
globally declared variables 
staticStringList Array List The static strings appearing 
in the code are stored in this 
array list and are obfuscated 
mapAlteredCode Hashtable The mapping of the method 
names and variable names 
to their respective 
obfuscated values is stored 
in this hashtable.  
 
5.4.2 Control Flow 
The control flow of the tool is illustrated in Figure 15.  The ANTLR parser is used 
to parse the source code.  The parser class generated by ANTLR was first altered to 
capture information about the source code.  We added functions and member variables in 
the parser class to capture the target program information dynamically at run time - 
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including method names, variable name, static strings declared in the target code, etc.  
The parser class holds the lists of parsed methods, variables and static strings in different 
data structures as described in Section 5.4.1.  The MD5 hash of the static strings is 
generated using an inbuilt function of C#.  The method and variable names are 
obfuscated using a random function.  The mapping of the original values and the 
obfuscated values is stored in a hash map.  The original values are then replaced with 
these obfuscated values in the parsed source code.  After the name mangling completes, 
other obfuscation techniques are then applied.  The examples of all the obfuscation 
techniques implemented are given in Section 5.4.3. 
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Figure 15 JShield: Control Flow 
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5.4.3 Algorithm and Result 
5.4.3.1 Scramble Identifiers 
As introduced in Section 3.2.1, scramble identifiers are used to change the names 
of variables and methods to meaningless strings.  This makes it difficult for the reverse 
engineer to derive meaningful hints from the actual names given by the programmer.  It 
targets the layout of the code and hence falls under the category of layout obfuscation 
(Gupta, 2005). 
Intent: To replace the method and variable names with meaningless strings. 
Algorithm: 
1.  Using he ANTLR parser (JShieldGramParser): 
a. Read the names of all variables and methods in two separate array lists 
(variableArrayList and methodArrayList respectively) 
(Roperia, 2009) 
2. Create an array list (keyList) to hold Java keywords and library function names 
that are not to be renamed 
3. Remove the keywords appearing in keyList from methodArrayList and 
variableArrayList 
4.  An inbuilt function is used to generate a random string for each name in the 
methodArrayList. The index of the method name in the list is passed to it as 
parameter.  
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5. Store the mapping of original and obfuscated names in a hash table 
(mapAlteredCode) where the original name is stored as the key and the 
obfuscated name is stored as the value 
6. All the variable and method names are replaced in the parsed code using the 
mapping now present in mapAlteredCode 
Input Validation: 
 
 For our proof of concept, the input given to JShield was the simple calculator 
program written in Java described earlier in chapter 4, where we documented its use in 
evaluating existing tools.  Figure 16 shows the constructor of the input program‟s main 
java class before obfuscation.  The original variable names are very helpful in 
understanding the program.  For example, the button that clears the contents of the 
display is named “clearButton”.  After the program has been obfuscated by our tool, 
the variable names get converted to meaningless strings, as shown in Figure 17. 
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Figure 16 Scramble Variable Names: Before 
 
 In the screenshot above, we can see the altered variable names. For example, 
“_displayfield” got replaced by “k”, “clearButton”  to “abcfqc”, and so on.  
 
Figure 17 Scramble Variable Names: After 
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 Similarly, the method names are also converted to meaningless strings.  The tool 
takes care of not converting the constructor name and other library classes like 
ActionListener. The names of accessors and mutators are also obfuscated in order 
to make the code look complicated to the reverse engineer.  In our simple calculator 
program, the method names shown in Figure 18 are obfuscated and result into names 
given in Figure 19.  A few examples of such conversion from our test runs are presented 
here: 
Before obfuscation After obfuscation 
CalcLogic ljcfhfccdn 
getTotalString ljcfhfccden 
setTotal ljcfhfccdejn 
Subtract ljcfhfccdejln 
 
   
Figure 18 Scramble Method Names: Before 
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Figure 19 Scramble Method Names: After 
 
5.4.3.2 Insert Dead or Irrelevant Code 
As introduced in Section 3.2.2.1, insertion of dead or irrelevant code falls under 
the category of control obfuscation.  Adding irrelevant code alters the control flow of the 
program thus making the program more obscure than the original (Gupta, 2005). 
Intent: To insert dead or irrelevant code. 
Algorithm:  
1. Parse the code using the ANTLR parser (ANTLR, n.d.) 
2. Create code templates to be inserted in the source code.  The code templates 
should be syntactically correct. 
3. Search the parsed code for the method signature of  main() – the starting and 
ending braces.  Return index of the method starting point. 
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4. Randomly insert one of the code templates into the target code using the index 
position.  The junk code is inserted in first position if the class has only one 
method and at random position if the class has more than one method. 
Input Validation: 
 To validate the insertion of junk code, the input given to the tool is a simple 
program that displays today‟s date.  The code input is given in Figure 20.  The output of 
the code after obfuscation is given in Figure 21.  
 The tool has inserted a new method “getPassword” and instantiated an 
arbitrary class “verifyPasswordUserExchange_def()”, which was inserted by 
the tool.  The simple program now looks complicated and it will be more time consuming 
to figure out the control flow of program. 
 
Figure 20 Inserting Dead Code: Before 
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Figure 21 Inserting Dead Code: After 
 
5.4.3.3 Extend Loop Condition 
As described in Section 3.2.2.1, the basic idea behind extending the loop 
condition is to make the termination condition more complex (Collberg et al., 1997).  The 
loop condition is extended adding a predicate to the condition.  The predicate should not 
affect the number of times the loop will execute. 
Intent: To add a predicate to the loop condition 
Algorithm: 
1. Parse the code using ANTLR parser (ANTLR, n.d.) 
2. Declare a variable in the code with a constant value: 
 v_addIfCondition = 10; 
3. Search the parsed code for “if” conditional loop and return the index of “(” that 
points to the start of the condition 
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4. Insert predicate “v_addIfCondition%2 == 1” to the loop condition with an 
OR operator “||”.   
The loop condition will evaluate to the same value as before. 
Input Validation: 
 For extending the loop condition we parsed the program of simple calculator 
using JShield.  The code has a code segment with “if” condition that checks if the value 
of keyTop variable is empty as shown in Figure 22.   
 
Figure 22 Extend Loop Condition: Before 
 
 After the code was obfuscated by JShield, the output is given in Figure 23.  The 
if loop conditional statement now has an additional condition that is 
v_addIfCondition%2 ==1, which will always evaluate to true.  The variable 
v_addIfCondition is declared by the tool and inserted with its value set to 10. 
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Figure 23 Extend Loop Condition: After 
 
5.4.3.4 Insert Bogus Class 
We discussed in Section 3.2.3.2, inserting a bogus class increases the amount of 
effort reverse engineer has to put in order to understand the program.  The class should 
appear as part of the logic of the program.  To ensure this, the bogus class initialized in 
the main class and the function calls are made to the member functions of the bogus 
class.  If it does not appear to be related to the logic of program, the reverse engineer will 
ignore it. 
Intent: Insert bogus class to the program 
Algorithm: 
1. Parse the code using ANTLR parser (ANTLR, n.d.) 
2. Create a static variable  
3. Initialize the variable with a randomly generated string (using inbuilt random 
function).   
4. Create a template bogus class and use the randomly generated static variable 
as its name.  For example, “verifyUserPasswordExchange_def” and check if 
another class exists with the same name in the target source code: 
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a. If no, save the template class at the location where the target 
program is located. 
b. If yes, repeat step 3. 
5. Search for the starting index of the main function in the target program. 
6. Define a static instance of the class and insert it before the given index 
position.  For example, 
7. static verifyUserPasswordExchange_def u_validity = new 
verifyUserPasswordExchange_def(); 
8. Use the instance created (“u_validity” in the example) in the inserted junk 
code templates to ensure that the bogus class is not deleted by a shrinker. 
Input Validation: 
 The code for the inserted bogus class is given in Figure 24.  The file is saved at 
the location where target program is stored.  Figure 25 shows the package structure of the 
workspace after insertion of bogus class. 
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Figure 24 Bogus Class Example 
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Figure 25 Eclipse Workspace: After Bogus Class Insertion 
 
5.4.3.5 Reorder Methods 
As described in Section 3.2.3.3, reordering of methods does not alter the control 
flow but obfuscates the program by hiding the control flow.  By convention, most of the 
programmers do write functions in an order which makes it easy for the reverse engineer 
to understand.  By altering the order, we can increase the time to be taken by reverse 
engineer to understand the logic.   
Intent: Change the order of the methods in class 
Algorithm: 
1. Parse the code using ANTLR parser (ANTLR, n.d.) 
2. Create templates of bogus methods to be inserted in the source code 
3. Find out the number of methods present in the class and return starting index of 
each function 
4. If there is only one function (main()), insert the code template before the main 
method, else insert the code template at random position before one of the 
functions 
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Input Validation: 
 The code segment from the program obfuscated using JShield is shown in Figure 
26.  The program has just one method i.e. main(), so the code template is added at the 
index right before the main method.  The output of the code is shown in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 26 Reorder Methods: Before 
 
 
Figure 27 Reorder Methods: After 
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5.4.3.6 Convert Static to Procedural Data 
As discussed in Section 3.2.3.1, strings with important information about the 
program can give out a lot of hints about what a section of code is trying to achieve.  It 
may also contain some copyright information.  Such strings should be encrypted in order 
to protect integrity of data. 
Intent: Encrypt static strings appearing in the program 
4. A corresponding decrypt function is created in the bogus class. 
5. All static strings are replaced by decrypt function in the input file, passing encrypted 
string as parameter. 
Algorithm: 
1. Extract all static strings present in the code during parsing and store in an array 
list staticStringList  
2. Apply encryption to all the strings (We used simple Caesar cipher with a shift of 
3) using encString (string plainText) 
3. Create decryption function to decrypt the strings in the bogus class, named 
str_toUpper() 
4. For each string in staticStringList, replace all static strings by decrypt 
function in the input file, passing encrypted string as parameter 
For example: 
System.out.println("Enter year"); gets converted to: 
System.out.println(OBJ_ANM.str_toUpper("Hqwhu#|hdu"));  
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Input Validation: 
 
Figure 28 Before String Obfuscation 
 
 
Figure 29 After String Obfuscation 
5.4.3.7 Add Redundant Operands 
As described in Section 3.2.2.1, adding some insignificant terms to the code, in 
the basic calculations confuses the reverse engineer.  This type of obfuscation can be 
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done by adding some code with a conditional loop which always returns true and does 
not affect the functionality of the code. 
Intent: Add redundant operand 
Algorithm: 
1. Parse the code using ANTLR parser (ANTLR,n.d.) 
2. Declare two integer variables x and y in the code and initialize them to any 
arbitrary integer values 
3. Find the index position of a function call statement and insert “if(7x2 – 1 == 
y
2”
) before the call 
4. The statement will be executed as per the control flow of the program 
Input Validation: 
 The tool adds redundant operands in the form of opaque predicates.  For example, 
in the code shown in Figure 30 the “if” loop has conditional statement (7x2 – 1 == 
y
2
) which will always be true and hence will not alter the actual control flow of the 
program.  If there are a lot of redundant operands in the program, the actual control flow 
appears more complex than without obfuscation. 
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Figure 30 Redundant Operand: Example 1 
 Another example of redundant operand is given in Figure 31.  The variable 
v_addIfCondition is declared as a global variable with value 10.  The condition 
inserts an additional statement “v_addIfCondition%2 == 1” which will always 
return true and hence the loop remains unaltered. 
 
Figure 31 Redundant Operand: Example 2 
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5.4.4 Result Validation 
Table 6 compares different tools with JShield on the basis of the different 
obfuscation techniques implemented by each of them.  Most of the commercial tools on 
the market do not reveal the exact algorithms or techniques that they use in order to make 
the program stronger against the reverse engineering attacks.  The question marks “?” in 
the table indicate that the tool implements at least one of the techniques listed in the 
category but does not reveal the details.  Based on the information given by the 
developers of these tools, it is evident that most of the tools do not apply much of control 
flow obfuscation except Zelix KlassMaster.   
Also, it is worth noticing that many obfuscators remove the dead code which 
contradicts with the basic principle of obfuscation.  The data obfuscation techniques 
emphasize the importance of inserting bogus class and control obfuscation technique 
indicates the usefulness of having dead or irrelevant code.  By removing the unused code 
from the program, we might make the job of reverse engineer easier. 
5.4.4.1 Observations 
 JShield implements maximum number of obfuscation techniques as compared to 
any other tool on the market. 
 All the tools on market implement different set of techniques while JShield 
provides a prototype for a tool that implements most of these techniques in one 
place. 
 JShield makes the Java code difficult to reverse engineer by applying various 
71 
obfuscation techniques.  The techniques that can be implemented to enhance the 
tool are mentioned in Section 6.2.  It is left as future work to enhance the 
capabilities of the tool to make it a commercially useful tool.   
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Table 7 Comparison of Tools 
Obfuscation Techniques JShield ProGuard Jshrink Zelix 
KlassMaster 
Layout Obfuscation √ √ √ √ 
Scramble Identifiers √ √ ? √ 
Control Obfuscation √ - - √ 
Insert dead or 
irrelevant code 
√ 
- - ? 
Extend loop condition √ - - ? 
Reducible to non-
reducible 
- - - ? 
Add redundant 
operands 
√ 
- - ? 
Removing 
programming idioms 
- - - ? 
Parallelize code - - - ? 
Inline and outline 
methods 
- - - ? 
Interleave methods - - - ? 
Clone methods - - - ? 
Loop transformations - - - ? 
Reorder statements, 
loops, expressions 
- - - ? 
Data Obfuscation √ √ - √ 
Change encoding - - - - 
Split variable - - - - 
Convert static to 
procedural data 
√ - - √ 
Merge scalar   
variables 
- - - - 
Factor/ Refactor class - - - - 
Insert bogus class √ - - - 
Split/ Merge/ Fold/ 
Flatten arrays 
- - - - 
Reorder methods and 
instance variables 
√ √ - - 
Reorder arrays - - - - 
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5.4.4.2 User Test Statistics 
JShield implements obfuscation to a given source code and produces obfuscated 
source code which is more difficult to reverse engineer than its original version.  To test 
the usefulness of the tool, we performed a few usability tests.  The tests were performed 
with seven Java developers with experience ranging from 3 years to 6 years (this ensured 
that they have sufficient knowledge of the language to understand the logic of the 
programs).  Four programs of different complexity (named Complex1, Complex2, 
Complex3, Complex4, with the last one being the most complex) were given to each one 
of the users and they were timed for understanding the logic of the program.  The details 
of the programs are given in Table 8 below and Table 9 shows the recorded times for 
understanding the logic of programs prior to obfuscation. 
Table 8 Test Programs 
Program Level of Complexity 
(1-4) 4 being highest 
Purpose of the Program 
Complex1 1 Simple Hello World application 
Complex2 2 A console game application named 21 
Sticks 
Complex3 3 Temperature Conversion Program with 
GUI 
Complex4 4 Simple Calculator 
 
After this the programs were obfuscated using JShield and the programs were 
given to the same users again.  The time taken by each to understand the logic was 
recorded again, shown in Table 10.  
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The programs were given to the users in random order.  For example, if program 
Complex1‟s obfuscated version was given first; next program might be any other 
obfuscated program or simply one of the four non-obfuscated versions.  This was done to 
ensure that the users do not get a hint from the program given to them for understanding 
the next code given to them.  The understanding of program was timed using a 
stopwatch.  The time measured for a user for correctly understanding was the time taken 
by the user to correctly interpret the business logic of the program.  
The user tests could not be statically used to validate the significance of results 
because of the small number of users.  The statistics do support that the logic of the 
program is difficult to understand in terms of time taken to interpret the logic after 
obfuscation.  Due to limited resources and other constraints, we could not establish any 
vital statistics about measurement of difficulty level to interpret the logic after 
obfuscation. 
Table 9 User Statistics: Before Obfuscation 
User Time taken in seconds 
Complex1 Complex2 Complex3 Complex4 
User1 5 180 152 254 
User2 8 129 129 350 
User3 4 152 139 308 
User4 6 120 180 406 
User5 5 141 195 496 
User6 5 202 184 581 
User7 5 190 202 630 
Average time 5.43 159.14 168.71 432.14 
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Table 10 User Statistics: After Obfuscation 
User Time taken in seconds 
Complex1 Complex2 Complex3 Complex4 
User1 60 579 591 1530 
User2 78 450 480 1800 
User3 40 802 702 1447 
User4 98 590 780 1671 
User5 46 705 705 1762 
User6 67 650 608 1280 
User7 44 880 830 1321 
Average time 61.86 665.14 670.86 1544.43 
 
The graphs below establish the time difference in understanding the original 
program and the obfuscated program.  Each graph presents the time difference for one 
program. 
 
Figure 32 User Statistics for Complex1 
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Figure 33 User Statistics for Complex2 
 
 
 
Figure 34 User Statistics for Complex3 
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Figure 35 User Statistics for Complex4 
 To further analyze the statistics derived from these user tests, we divide 
the users into three groups depending on the years of experience that they do have.  The 
categories thus created are 3-4 years of experience, 4-5 years, and 5-6 years.  The users 
are listed in their respective categories here: 
3- 4 years – Group1 4-5 years – Group2 5-6 years – Group3 
User1, User3, User7 User2, User4 User5, User6 
 
We do calculate the average time taken by each of the user groups for each one of 
the four target programs.  The table below shows these calculated timings: 
Table 11 Average time taken by users 
 Complex1 Complex2 Complex3 Complex4 
Group1 48 753.67 707.66 1432.66 
Group2 88 520 630 1735.5 
Group3 56.5 677.5 656.5 1521 
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The graph shown in Figure 36 indicates experience of the user does not introduce 
too much variation in the time taken by users in understanding the logic. 
 
Figure 36 User Groups Statistics 
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6.0 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
“The future you see is the future you get.” 
(Robert G Allen) 
6.1 Conclusion 
With the availability of so many advanced tools and techniques, Java programs 
are vulnerable to reverse engineering attacks.  The research described in this thesis has 
lead to the creation of a new tool to automate the application of strong anti-reversing 
techniques to Java programs. This effort can go a long way in addressing the problems of 
unauthorized access to source code and IP theft using reverse engineering attacks that the 
industry currently faces.  In 2008, the reported loss to the software industry due to 
software piracy in general was $47.809 billion (Business Software Alliance, May 2008).  
This loss increased to $51.41 billion in May 2010 (Business Software Alliance, May 
2010).  As such, it might very well be impossible to eradicate it but our tool can surely 
make the reverse engineering effort hard and practically worthless.  
In this paper, we presented the different techniques that are helpful in protecting 
Java software from reverse engineering attacks.  We discussed the different obfuscation 
techniques previously developed.  We identified the techniques that could be automated 
and then developed a prototype to demonstrate the automated application of these 
techniques.  The obfuscation is applied to the java source code files and our tool 
generates an obfuscated version of the code as its output.  During multiple trials and tests 
(Section 5.4.4.2), we verified that the functionality and performance of the program 
remained unaffected when compared to the version before the changes were implemented 
(Appendix C).   
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Additionally, we analyzed the existing tools on the market that address this 
problem - both commercial and open source.  After detailed analysis, we found each of 
the existing tools lacking in the set of obfuscation techniques they could automate.  We 
established a genuine gap in the market for a tool that could provide stronger protection 
and scope for in depth research in this field.  
6.2 Future Work 
The current prototype of JShield works on one Java source file at a time.  A full 
version could be easily created by enhancing the prototype and that would work on an 
entire project containing several Java files.   
Our proof of concept for this thesis implements seven obfuscation techniques in 
total.   Further research based on this ground work would lead to automation of even 
more techniques and in fact, development of more advanced techniques based on future 
needs.  Needless to say, if all the known obfuscation techniques could be automated, it 
would make this tool even more powerful. At the conclusion of this thesis and the 
accompanying research, we found that certain techniques could only be applied by 
human intervention while others could not be fit into our proof of concept.   
The techniques that have not been implemented are listed here in the order of 
increasing difficulty level. 
 Clone methods 
 Reorder statements, loops, expressions 
 Reorder/ Split/ Merge/ Fold/ Flatten arrays 
 Loop transformations 
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 Merge scalar variables 
 Factor/ Refactor class 
 Inline and outline methods 
 Parallelize code 
 Change encoding 
 Split variable 
 Interleave methods 
 Reducible to non-reducible 
 Removing programming idioms 
Out of the above listed techniques, we believe it would be most beneficial to 
implement clone methods, reorder expressions and loops, change the arrays and loop 
transformations.  These techniques will make it difficult for the hacker to understand the 
logic behind decompiled snippets of code.   
The techniques that are most difficult to automate in our opinion are removing 
programming idioms, reducible to non-reducible, and interleave methods.  The technique 
of removing programming idioms (Section 3.2.2.1) is actually impossible to automate as 
it deals with changing the way programmers write their code in the first place.  The 
technique of converting reducible to non-reducible (Section 3.2.2.1) is mostly applicable 
in case of bytecode obfuscation.  JShield works with obfuscating the source code and 
hence it is not possible to add code which is syntactically unacceptable to the compiler.  
The difficulty in automating the interleave methods (Section 3.2.2.2) is that it needs 
extensive understanding of the business logic to manipulate the code to interleave two 
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methods.  If the business logic is altered incorrectly, it might affect the functionality of 
the software. 
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APPENDIX A: ANTLR Parser 
What is ANTLR? 
 “ANTLR, ANother Tool for Language Recognition, is a language tool that 
provides a framework for constructing recognizers, interpreters, compilers, and 
translators from grammatical descriptions containing actions in a variety of target 
languages.  ANTLR provides excellent support for tree construction, tree walking, 
translation, error recovery, and error reporting.” (ANTLR, n.d.) 
How ANTLR works? 
 ANTLR provides a grammar development environment, developed by Jean 
Bovet, called ANTLRWorks (The ANTLR GUI Development Environment).   
ANTLRWorks combines an editor and an interpreter which helps in rapid prototyping 
(Parr, 2007).  ANTLRWorks needs Java 1.5 or later to execute.  We used version 1.1.3 of 
ANTLRWorks. 
 Figure 37 shows the high level interface of ANTLRWorks.  ANTLRWorks helps 
in understanding the rules of grammar by providing syntax diagrams of the grammar 
rules.  ANTLRWorks can generate parsers for multiple target languages like Java, C#, 
C++, and Python (ANTLR, n.d.).  
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Figure 37 ANTLRWorks Interface 
 
 We used ANTLRWorks to generate a parser in C#.  The code generated by 
ANTLRWorks is integrated into Microsoft Visual Studio 2005.  ANTLRWorks takes 
Java grammar as input and generates parser and lexer classes in C# thus making it easy to 
integrate the parser.   
 We declare data structures in the grammar to capture information about the target 
class.  Figure 38 shows a code snippet of one such addition.  The code added to the parser 
is to capture the required information about the code at runtime.  When the Java code is 
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parsed, we capture information about the methods, variables, etc. and store it in data 
structures, as explained in Section 5.4.1.   
 
Figure 38 Code Snippet 
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APPENDIX B: Terminology 
AST-based clone detection: 
 The AST-based clone detection technique was suggested by (Baxter et al., 1998).  
In this technique, the source code is parsed to build an abstract syntax tree (AST) and the 
subtrees are compared to detect clones. 
Clones (in software systems): 
 “Copying code fragments and then reuse by pasting with or without minor 
modifications or adaptations are common activities in software development. This type of 
reuse approach of existing code is called code cloning and the pasted code fragment (with 
or without modifications) is called a clone of the original.” (Cordy & Roy, 2007) 
Code Smell:  
 The software undergoes a lot of changes during its life cycle.  This may introduce 
some undesirable design flaws in the code.  These design flaws which are introduced in 
the system during the maintenance phase of life cycle are called code smells. (Roperia, 
2009) 
Metrics-based clone detection: 
 “Metrics-based techniques gather a number of metrics for code fragments and 
then compare metrics vectors rather than code or ASTs directly.  One popular technique 
involves fingerprinting functions, metrics calculated for syntactic units such as a class, 
function, method or statement that yield values that can be compared to find clones of 
these syntactic units.” (Cordy & Roy, n.d.) 
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Reducible & Nonreducible: 
 The bytecode that cannot be converted back to its original code is termed as 
nonreducible.  For example inserting a goto statement in bytecode shall make the 
bytecode nonreducible as the equivalent of goto statement is not available in Java 
language.  The reducible code is the bytecode that is converted back to its original source 
code with the help of a decompiler.  
Token-based clone detection: 
 “A clone detection technique, which consists of the transformation of input source 
text and a token-by-token comparison.” (Inoue et al., 2002)  The source code is converted 
into a sequence of tokens using lexical analyzer and then these sequences are matched to 
detect clone. 
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APPENDIX C: JShield Example 
 We use a java program of simple calculator that we use here to demonstrate the 
functionality of JShield and to verify that the logic of the target program remains 
unaltered after obfuscation using JShield.  The original code of simple calculator is given 
in Table 12 (Program adopted from (Swartz, 2007) under MIT License). 
Table 12 Simple Calculator: Before Obfuscation 
import java.awt.BorderLayout; 
import java.awt.FlowLayout; 
import java.awt.Font; 
import java.awt.GridLayout; 
import java.awt.event.ActionEvent; 
import java.awt.event.ActionListener; 
 
import javax.swing.BorderFactory; 
import javax.swing.JButton; 
import javax.swing.JFrame; 
import javax.swing.JPanel; 
import javax.swing.JTextField; 
import javax.swing.UIManager; 
 
class Calculator extends JFrame { 
 
 private static final Font BIGGER_FONT = new Font("monspaced", 
Font.PLAIN, 20); 
 
 private JTextField _displayField;        
 private boolean   _startNumber = true;   
 private String    _previousOp  = "=";    
 private CalcLogic _logic = new CalcLogic(); 
 
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
 
  try { 
  
 UIManager.setLookAndFeel(UIManager.getSystemLookAndFeelClassName(
)); 
  } catch (Exception unused) { 
   ; 
  } 
 
  Calculator window = new Calculator(); 
  window.setDefaultCloseOperation(JFrame.EXIT_ON_CLOSE); 
  window.setVisible(true); 
 } 
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 public Calculator() { 
  _displayField = new JTextField("0", 12); 
  _displayField.setHorizontalAlignment(JTextField.RIGHT); 
  _displayField.setFont(BIGGER_FONT); 
  JButton clearButton = new JButton("Clear"); 
  clearButton.setFont(BIGGER_FONT); 
  clearButton.addActionListener(new ClearListener()); 
  ActionListener numListener = new NumListener(); 
  String buttonOrder = "789456123 0 "; 
  JPanel buttonPanel = new JPanel(); 
  buttonPanel.setLayout(new GridLayout(5, 3, 2, 2)); 
  for (int i = 0; i < buttonOrder.length(); i++) { 
   String keyTop = buttonOrder.substring(i, i+1); 
   JButton b = new JButton(keyTop); 
   if (keyTop.equals(" ")) { 
    b.setEnabled(false); 
   } else { 
    b.addActionListener(numListener); 
    b.setFont(BIGGER_FONT); 
   } 
   buttonPanel.add(b); 
  } 
 
  ActionListener opListener = new OpListener(); 
  JPanel opPanel = new JPanel(); 
  opPanel.setLayout(new GridLayout(5, 1, 2, 2)); 
  String[] opOrder = {"+", "-", "*", "/", "="}; 
  for (int i = 0; i < opOrder.length; i++) { 
   JButton b = new JButton(opOrder[i]); 
   b.addActionListener(opListener); 
   b.setFont(BIGGER_FONT); 
   opPanel.add(b); 
  } 
 
  JPanel clearPanel = new JPanel(); 
  clearPanel.setLayout(new FlowLayout()); 
  clearPanel.add(clearButton); 
 
  JPanel content = new JPanel(); 
  content.setLayout(new BorderLayout(5, 5)); 
  content.add(_displayField, BorderLayout.NORTH ); 
  content.add(buttonPanel   , BorderLayout.CENTER); 
  content.add(opPanel       , BorderLayout.EAST  ); 
  content.add(clearPanel    , BorderLayout.SOUTH ); 
 
 
 content.setBorder(BorderFactory.createEmptyBorder(10,10,10,10)); 
  this.setContentPane(content); 
  this.pack(); 
  this.setTitle("Simple Calc"); 
  this.setResizable(false); 
  this.setLocationRelativeTo(null); 
 }     
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 private void actionClear() { 
  _startNumber = true;     
  _displayField.setText("0"); 
  _previousOp  = "="; 
  _logic.setTotal("0"); 
 } 
 
 class OpListener implements ActionListener { 
  public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) { 
   if (_startNumber) {  
    actionClear(); 
    _displayField.setText("ERROR - No operator"); 
   } else { 
    _startNumber = true;   
    try {                    
     String displayText = 
_displayField.getText(); 
     if (_previousOp.equals("=")) { 
      _logic.setTotal(displayText); 
     } else if (_previousOp.equals("+")) { 
      _logic.add(displayText); 
     } else if (_previousOp.equals("-")) { 
      _logic.subtract(displayText); 
     } else if (_previousOp.equals("*")) { 
      _logic.multiply(displayText); 
     } else if (_previousOp.equals("/")) { 
      _logic.divide(displayText); 
     } 
 
     _displayField.setText("" + 
_logic.getTotalString()); 
 
    } catch (NumberFormatException ex) { 
     actionClear(); 
     _displayField.setText("Error"); 
    } 
 
    _previousOp = e.getActionCommand(); 
   } 
  } 
 }     
 
 class NumListener implements ActionListener { 
  public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) { 
   String digit = e.getActionCommand();  
   if (_startNumber) { 
    _displayField.setText(digit); 
    _startNumber = false; 
   } else { 
    _displayField.setText(_displayField.getText() + 
digit); 
   } 
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  } 
 } 
 
 class ClearListener implements ActionListener { 
  public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) { 
   actionClear(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 public class CalcLogic { 
  private int _currentTotal;  
 
  /** Constructor */ 
  public CalcLogic() { 
   _currentTotal = 0; 
  } 
 
  public String getTotalString() { 
   return "" + _currentTotal; 
  } 
 
  public void setTotal(String n) { 
   _currentTotal = convertToNumber(n); 
  } 
 
  public void add(String n) { 
   _currentTotal += convertToNumber(n); 
  } 
 
  public void subtract(String n) { 
   _currentTotal -= convertToNumber(n); 
  } 
 
  public void multiply(String n) { 
   _currentTotal *= convertToNumber(n); 
  } 
 
  public void divide(String n) { 
   _currentTotal /= convertToNumber(n); 
  } 
 
  private int convertToNumber(String n) { 
   return Integer.parseInt(n); 
  } 
 }} 
 
 
 The execution of the original program yields a simple calculator that performs all 
basic mathematical operations.  The screenshot for the output I given in Figure 39 below: 
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Figure 39 Simple Calculator Output 
 Table 13 shows the code after the program is obfuscated using JShield. 
Table 13 Simple Calculator: After Obfuscation 
import java.awt.BorderLayout; 
import java.awt.FlowLayout; 
import java.awt.Font; 
import java.awt.GridLayout; 
import java.awt.event.ActionEvent; 
import java.awt.event.ActionListener; 
 
import javax.swing.BorderFactory; 
import javax.swing.JButton; 
import javax.swing.JFrame; 
import javax.swing.JPanel; 
import javax.swing.JTextField; 
import javax.swing.UIManager; 
 
class Calc extends JFrame { 
 static emacglocnds OBJ_AHNAGBBQIB = new emacglocnds(); 
  static int v_addIfCondition = 10; 
 
 private static final Font BIGGER_FONT = new Font("monspaced", 
Font.PLAIN, 20); 
 
 private JTextField _displayField;        
 private boolean   r = true;   
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 private String    te  = "=";    
 private lldgfn _logic = new lldgfn(); 
 
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
 
  try { 
  
 UIManager.setLookAndFeel(UIManager.getSystemLookAndFeelClassName(
)); 
  } catch (Exception unused) { 
   ; 
  } 
  Calc window = new Calc(); 
  window.setDefaultCloseOperation(JFrame.EXIT_ON_CLOSE); 
  window.setVisible(true); 
 } 
 
 public Calc() { 
  _displayField = new JTextField("0", 12); 
  _displayField.setHorizontalAlignment(JTextField.RIGHT); 
  _displayField.setFont(BIGGER_FONT); 
  JButton clearButton = new JButton("Clear"); 
  clearButton.setFont(BIGGER_FONT); 
  clearButton.addActionListener(new ClearListener()); 
  ActionListener numListener = new NumListener(); 
  String tdi = "789456123 0 "; 
  JPanel buttonPanel = new JPanel(); 
  buttonPanel.setLayout(new GridLayout(5, 3, 2, 2)); 
  for (int i = 0; i < tdi.length(); i++) { 
   String tdklt = tdi.substring(i, i+1); 
   JButton b = new JButton(tdklt); 
   if (v_addIfCondition%2 == 1 || tdklt.equals(" ")) { 
    b.setEnabled(false); 
   } else { 
    b.addActionListener(numListener); 
    b.setFont(BIGGER_FONT); 
   } 
   buttonPanel.add(b); 
  } 
 
  ActionListener tdklgbm = new OpListener(); 
  JPanel tdklgbdn = new JPanel(); 
  tdklgbdn.setLayout(new GridLayout(5, 1, 2, 2)); 
  String[] tdklgbdjh = {"+", "-", "*", "/", "="}; 
  for (int i = 0; i < tdklgbdjh.length; i++) { 
   JButton b = new JButton(tdklgbdjh[i]); 
   b.addActionListener(tdklgbm); 
   b.setFont(BIGGER_FONT); 
   tdklgbdn.add(b); 
  } 
 
  JPanel tdklgbdjdaaq = new JPanel(); 
  tdklgbdjdaaq.setLayout(new FlowLayout()); 
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  tdklgbdjdaaq.add(clearButton); 
 
  JPanel tdklgbdjdaajf = new JPanel(); 
  tdklgbdjdaajf.setLayout(new BorderLayout(5, 5)); 
  tdklgbdjdaajf.add(_displayField, BorderLayout.NORTH ); 
  tdklgbdjdaajf.add(buttonPanel   , BorderLayout.CENTER); 
  tdklgbdjdaajf.add(tdklgbdn       , BorderLayout.EAST  ); 
  tdklgbdjdaajf.add(tdklgbdjdaaq    , BorderLayout.SOUTH ); 
 
 
 tdklgbdjdaajf.setBorder(BorderFactory.createEmptyBorder(10,10,10,
10)); 
  this.setContentPane(tdklgbdjdaajf); 
  this.pack(); 
  this.setTitle("Simple Calc"); 
  this.setResizable(false); 
  this.setLocationRelativeTo(null); 
 }     
 
 private void lldgn() { 
  r = true;     
  _displayField.setText("0"); 
  te  = "="; 
  _logic.setTotal("0"); 
 } 
 
 class OpListener implements ActionListener { 
  
 
 public String getPassword(int ID){ 
 String t_password = ""; 
 t_password = OBJ_AHNAGBBQIB.returnPassword(ID); 
 if(!t_password.equals("User not found")) 
  return t_password; 
 else 
  return ""; 
 } public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) { 
  int v_userID = 3; 
 if(v_userID == 3){} 
 
   if (r) {  
    lldgn(); 
    _displayField.setText("ERROR - No operator"); 
   } else { 
    r = true;   
    try {                    
     String tdklgbdjdaajbi = 
_displayField.getText(); 
     if (te.equals("=")) { 
      _logic.setTotal(tdklgbdjdaajbi); 
     } else if (te.equals("+")) { 
      _logic.add(tdklgbdjdaajbi); 
     } else if (te.equals("-")) { 
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      _logic.subtract(tdklgbdjdaajbi); 
     } else if (te.equals("*")) { 
      _logic.multiply(tdklgbdjdaajbi); 
     } else if (te.equals("/")) { 
      _logic.divide(tdklgbdjdaajbi); 
     } 
 
     _displayField.setText("" + 
_logic.getTotalString()); 
 
    } catch (NumberFormatException ex) { 
     lldgn(); 
     _displayField.setText("Error"); 
    } 
 
    te = e.getActionCommand(); 
   } 
  } 
 }     
 
 class NumListener implements ActionListener { 
  public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) { 
   String tdklgbdjdaajbcr = e.getActionCommand();  
   if (r) { 
    _displayField.setText(tdklgbdjdaajbcr); 
    r = false; 
   } else { 
    _displayField.setText(_displayField.getText() + 
tdklgbdjdaajbcr); 
   } 
  } 
 } 
 
 class ClearListener implements ActionListener { 
  public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) { 
   lldgn(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 public class lldgfn { 
  private int tdklgbdjdaajbcqb;  
 
  /** Constructor */ 
  public lldgfn() { 
   tdklgbdjdaajbcqb = 0; 
  } 
 
  public String getTotalString() { 
   return "" + tdklgbdjdaajbcqb; 
  } 
 
  public void setTotal(String n) { 
   tdklgbdjdaajbcqb = convertToNumber(n); 
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  } 
 
  public void add(String n) { 
   tdklgbdjdaajbcqb += convertToNumber(n); 
  } 
 
  public void subtract(String n) { 
   tdklgbdjdaajbcqb -= convertToNumber(n); 
  } 
 
  public void multiply(String n) { 
   tdklgbdjdaajbcqb *= convertToNumber(n); 
  } 
 
  public void divide(String n) { 
   tdklgbdjdaajbcqb /= convertToNumber(n); 
  } 
 
  private int convertToNumber(String n) { 
   return Integer.parseInt(n); 
  } 
 }} 
 
 The output of the program after obfuscation is shown in Figure 40 below: 
 
Figure 40 Obfuscated Calculator Program Output 
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Memory Size and Runtime Performance: 
 There is negligible change in the memory size of the program.  For example, in 
case of simple calculator the memory size before obfuscation is 5,014 bytes.  After the 
obfuscation is done, the size of the file is 5,094 bytes.  Although the size of the file itself 
doesn‟t change much, the addition of the bogus class increases the size of the program.  
The runtime performance of the program remains unaffected as well.  We tested the 
runtime performance by running a loop that executed 1000000 times.  The time of 
execution before and after the obfuscation was noted to be same. 
